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Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth 
 
Atomic sentences Ȃ or the propositions they express Ȃ can be true, as can logically complex 
sentences composed out of atomic sentences.1  A comprehensive metaphysics of truth aims to tell 
us, in an informative way, what the truth of any sentence whatsoever consists in, be it atomic or 
complex.  Monists about truth are committed to truth always consisting in the same thing, no 
matter which sentence you consider.  Pluralists about truth think that the nature of truth is 
different for different sets of sentences.  The received view seems to be that logically complex 
sentences Ȃ and indeed logic itself Ȃ somehow impose a monistic constraint on any 
comprehensive metaphysics of truth.  In what follows, I argue that the received view is mistaken. 
Some theorists have suggested that logically complex sentences impose a monistic 
constraint on our comprehensive metaphysics, on the grounds that a complex sentence needs to 
be true in the same way as its components.  Here, for instance, is Roy Cook on conjunctions: 
 
A conjunction is true if and only if the conjuncts are true, and further, the conjunction 
should be true in the same way as its conjuncts are.  (Cook 2011: 626)2 
 
From this it follows that the two conjuncts need to be true in the same way as each other; 
so long as any truth-apt sentence can be conjoined with any other, it follows that all sentences are 
true in the same way, as per monism.3 
                                                          
1 / ?ŵŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌĞĂƐĞ ?ďƵƚ / ?ŵŶĞƵƚƌĂůŽŶƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ  ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?ƚƌƵƚŚďĞĂƌĞƌƐ.  I also 
assume for the purposes of this paper that we can say something informative about the nature of truth, contra 
ĚĞĨůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĂŶĚƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?/ƚ ?ƐǁŽƌƚŚŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚƌƵƚŚĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞŶĂŵĞ  ?pluralism ? too, 
but I stipulate what I will mean by the term below. 
2 For discussion, see: Cotnoir 2009; Edwards 2008, 2009; Künne 2003: 453; Lynch 2004, 2009: 54-67; Tappolet 
2000; Williamson 1994.  Note that the concept/property distinction has not always been clearly in mind in these 
discussions; some are either explicitly or more charitably interpreted as concerned with monism/pluralism about 
the concept of truth.  I am concerned here with the metaphysics of truth, not the concept.  One might try and 
argue from a unified concept to a unified metaphysics, but that is a different argument to those considered here. 
3 One may take issue with this reasoning (Cook himself tries to do so ? ?ďƵƚ ůĞƚ ?Ɛ ƐĞƚ ŝƚ ĂƐŝĚĞ ƚŽ ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ƚŚĞ
underlying assumption.  Note that this is often taken to be consistent with a more  ?moderate ? kind of pluralism, 
which says that truth is both one and many: truth is a single, unified, property which is nonetheless realized in, 
manifested in, or determined by different properties for different sentences. 
But why should we buy this constraint?  Little argument has been given for it; it seems to 
be assumed as ǤǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤǤ
follows from this Ǯtruismǯ is: 
 
Conjunction Constraint 
If the trǮǯ	ǡǮǯ
ǡǮƬǯ&, then F, G, 
and H& ǣȋǮǯ	Ǯǯ
ȌǮƬǯ&. 
 
To this, we might add an order of explanatory dependence from right to left: a conjunction 
is plausibly true because its conjuncts are true (Edwards 2008: 146-7).  Ǯǯ
constitutive explanation, or grounding. 
Critically, this constraint is not automatically satisfied just by postulating an identity 
between F, G, and H&, as the monist does.  This is obvious: a conjunction does not possess every 
property that is possessed by both of its conjuncts.  Consider the property of being logically simple. 
The same point goes for other logical complexes, like negations, disjunctions, or whatever.  
Assuming that these are truth-functional,4 our metaphysics is subject to the following constraints: 
 
Negation Constraint Ǯǯ	Ǯ~ǯ~, then F and H~ ǣǮǯ	Ǯ~ǯ~.  
 
                                                          
4 It is really truth-functional complexes in particular that I am interested in here, whichever these may be; i.e., 
those complexes whose status with regards to truƚŚ ŝƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇďǇƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐǁŝƚŚ
regards to truth.  It is these that are most prominently thought to motivate monism.  Non-truth-functional 
complexes need to be accounted for by a comprehensive metaphysics of truth too, of course, but it is hard to 
see how these could pose any special problem for the pluralist.  After all, the monist is constrained to say that 
the truth of such sentences consists in the same thing as the truth an ordinary atomic sentence.  If this is 
plausible, the pluralist can say it too; but if not, then the monist is stuck, while the pluralist can say it consists in 
something else. 
Disjunction Constraint Ǯǯ	ǡǮǯ
ǡǮB? ǯB?, then F, G, 
and HB? ǣȋǮǯ	Ǯǯ
ȌǮB? ǯB?. 
 
Perhaps with the relevant right-to-left explanatory dependencies too.  None of these 
constraints is satisfied merely by postulating an identity between the properties F, G, and H: a 
negation does not possess every property that its negand does not possess; a disjunction does not 
possess every property possessed by either of its disjuncts.  So merely being a monist does not ǯǤ  This needs to be shown. 
Indeed, once we realize this it is striking that the most prominent monistic theories may 
not satisfy these constraints.  The correspondence theory of truth says that truth consists in 
correspondence with the facts, but do negations correspond to negative facts, or conjunctions to 
conjunctive facts, etc.?  If we find that implausible, then we find the idea that the correspondence 
theory satisfies any of these constraints implausible.5  The superwarrant theory says (roughly) 
that a sentence is true just in case it is warranted in a state of information, and would remain 
warranted through any expansion to this state of information.  But then a disjunction might be 
superwarranted even if neither of its disjuncts are superwarranted, violating Disjunction 
Constraint: we might, say, have a proof that the disjunction is true without having a proof 
concerning which disjunct is true.  The coherence theory says that truth consists in being coherent Ǥǯ
its negation will cohere, since the relevant beliefs may not lend support either way, violating 
Negation Constraint.  I do not intend this as an objection to these monistic theories Ȃ there is a 
multiplicity of responses one might give, including rejecting the constraints for the complexes in 
question; and perhaps when the theories are properly fleshed out, they will avoid these 
difficulties.  But my point is just that merely postulating an identity here Ȃ i.e., merely being a 
                                                          
5 The correspondence theory is discussed in this context by Edwards (2008).  The worry is an acute one.  To avoid 
postulating negative facts, truthmaker maximalists for instance have postulated exotic entities like totality facts 
(Armstrong 2004) or absences (Martin 1996), or even denied that there are negative truths (Mumford 2007). 
monist, even of one of the mainstream, Ǯpopularǯ varieties Ȃ     ǯ
metaphysics satisfies the relevant constraints.6  Rather, these are perfectly general constraints 
that any comprehensive metaphysics will have to show that it meets. 
In a similar vein, monists are taken to have the upper hand when it comes to validity.  
According to the semantic account, we are told, validity consists in necessary truth preservation.  
But then, for any valid inference, there must be a single property that the truth of every sentence 
involved consists in, for it is the necessary preservation of this property that the validity of the 
inference consists in.  ǮǯǮǯǮƬǯǡȂ truth Ȃ ǮǯǮǯr conjunction.  Similarly, since one ǮǯǮB?ǯǮǯǡ Ȃ truth Ȃ ǮǯǮǯǤ  The truth of the complexes must therefore consist in the same thing as 
the truth of the atomics, which must therefore consist in the same thing as each other.7 
Talk of Ǯpreservationǯ certainly implies that there needs to be something that is preserved.  
However, we ought to be careful not to take the idea of necessary truth preservation too seriously 
here, for it is not meant literally.  First, PRESERVATION is a diachronic concept: things are preserved 
across time.  VALIDITY, by contrast, is synchronic: arguments are not valid across time, they are 
valid at a time.  We do not have to wait for the truth of the conclusion once we have the truth of 
the premisses.  And, in any case, there are clear cases of valid arguments where no one would 
want to say that any property has been Ǯpreservedǯ from the premisses to the conclusion.  For 
instance, there are 0-premiss valid arguments with necessarily true conclusions.  There is no 
question of a property being Ǯpreservedǯ from the premisses to the conclusion, because there are 
no premisses.  Similarly, arguments with inconsistent premisses are valid; indeed, they are valid 
                                                          
6 Cotnoir (2009: 477-8) suggests that we  ?let ? negations be true in the same way as their negands, and 
disjunctions in the same way as (perhaps both of) their disjuncts.  But, as these worries make clear, we cannot 
simply stipulate these substantive metaphysical theses! 
7 See especially: Beall 2000; Cotnoir 2013; Lynch 2004, 2009; Pedersen 2006; Strollo 2016; Tappolet 1997, 2000; 
Williamson 1994.  Beall, Cotnoir, Pedersen, and Strollo each suggest an interpretation of validity that they 
contend is consistent with pluralism, but in doing so grant the underlying point that I reject: that there is any 
incompatibility between the orthodox semantic account of validity and pluralism about truth. 
even if they have necessarily false conclusions.  Once again, there is no question of some property 
being Ǯpreservedǯ from (all) the premisses to the conclusion. 
This is because the semantic account does not hold that validity literally consists in some 
property being preserved from the premisses to the conclusion: the idea of necessary truth 
preservation is metaphorical.  It is a nice way of talking about the principle that: necessarily, if the 
premisses are true, then the conclusion is true.  What constraint does this put on our metaphysics 
of truth?  Again, I think the constraint is structural: 
 
Semantic Validity Constraint 
For any valid argument from premisses {A1ǡ ǥǡ n} to conclusion B, if the truth of A1 
consists in F1ǡǥǡ the truth of An in Fn, and the truth of B in G, then F1ǡǥǡ	n, and G are such 
that: necessarily, if (A1 is F1ǡǥǡn is Fn), then B is G. 
 
It is immediately apparent once this is made explicit that it too is not automatically 
satisfied by postulating an identity between F1ǡǥǡ	n, and G: the conclusion of a valid argument is 
not in general guaranteed to possess a property just because it is exemplified by all the premisses 
of that argument.  If one is sceptical of this, take your favourite valid argument Arg and consider 
the property of being a premiss in Arg.  All the premisses exemplify that property; the conclusion 
does not.  (Unless your favourite argument begs the question, of course.)  Once again, merely being 
a monist does not guarantee that oneǯ
validity. 
What is important to validity is not identity or literal Ǯpreservationǯ of a property, but 
structural dependency: the truth of the different sentences must depend on each other in the right 
way, such that the conclusion cannot fail to be true when the premisses are so.  This is 
unsurprising: logicians are not concerned with Ǯtrackingǯ some property as it moves hither and 
thither across inferences; they are concerned with modelling the structural dependencies 
between the truth of different sentences.  My point is that postulating a uniformity in the nature 
      ǯ     
dependencies. 
As far as I can see, then, there is nothing about the truth of truth-functional complexes or 
the semantic account of validity that imposes a monistic constraint on our metaphysics of truth. 
On the contrary, they both impose structural constraints on our metaphysics of truth, and 
monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints just because they are monistic.  
Indeed, the monist is, if anything, at a tactical disadvantage here, insofar as she is constrained to 
postulate an identity, where the pluralist is not.  Imposing a further   ǯ
metaphysics of truth can hardly be thought to put one at a theoretical advantage! 
Of course, it is one thing to argue that these constraints are not automatically satisfied by 
postulating an identity between the relevant properties, and quite another to show that they can 
be satisfied by a theory that does not postulate such an identity.  Even showing the former is 
sufficient to undermine two of the prominent objections to pluralism about truth.  But the latter, 
too, can be done quite straightforwardly. 	ǡ  ǮAǯ          
consists in.  If one is a monist at the level of atomics, this might be correspondence with the facts, 
say, or superwarrant, or coherence.  If one is a pluralist at the level of atomics, such that the truth 
of an atomic sentence in set S1 consists in T1ǡǥǡn consists in Tn, then let it abbreviate the ǣǮȋ1 and T1Ȍǥis (in Sn and TnȌǯǤ(This is ultimately dispensable Ȃ see fn.12 Ȃ but will help for ease of exposition.)  Next, let the order of a complex sentence be one order 
greater than its highest-order component, and let atomics be 0th-order.  Here, then, is a pluralist 
theory of truth for first-order: negations, T~1; conjunctions, T&1; disjunctions, TB?1; and 
conditionals, TB? ?: 
 B?p (T~1ȋǮ~ǯȌB?~TAȋǮǯȌȌǤ B?pB?q (T&1ȋǮƬǯȌB?ȋAȋǮǯȌƬAȋǮǯȌȌȌǤ B?pB?q (TB?1ȋǮB? ǯȌB?ȋAȋǮǯȌB? TAȋǮǯȌȌȌǤ 
B?pB?q (TB? ?ȋǮB?ǯȌB?ȋAȋǮǯȌB?AȋǮǯȌȌȌǤ8 
 
For instance, the truth of a first-order conjunction consists in its conjoining a sentence 
that is TA with another sentence that is TA; the truth of a first-order negation consists in its 
negating a sentence that is not TA.  It should go without saying that this account trivially satisfies 
the constraints laid out above.  For instance, the dependence of TB? ? on TA is such that, necessarily, ǮǯA ǮB?ǯ is TB? ?ǡǮǯAǢǮǯA Ǯǯnot TA, then by definition ǮB?ǯ TB? ?.  ǮǯǮǯǮƬǯǤ  It should 
also go without saying that the proposal is pluralistic: the property of conjoining a sentence that 
corresponds with the facts with a sentence that corresponds with the facts is a different property 
from simply corresponding with the facts, for example; so even if atomics are only ever true in 
virtue of corresponding, this theory has it that the truth of the complex consists in a property 
distinct from, but grounded in, the property the truth of its components consists in.9  One may 
doubt that, e.g., T&1 is really a property in some plumped-ǡǮǯǮǯǤǡ
can translate the paper into terms one prefers.  The important claim is that this is what the truth 
of the complex consists in (see also fn.10). 
This proposal might look unappealing at first glance, but this impression quickly fades.  
Indeed, what is most striking about it is that any inflationist is already committed to the 
extensional adequacy of the properties in question for the relevant sets of sentences.  The 
correspondence monist, for instance, is committed to all and only those first-order conjunctions 
that are true being those that conjoin a sentence that corresponds with a sentence that 
corresponds, which is just the property of being T&1 (by their lights).  What she denies is that this 
is what the truth of the conjunction consists in.  Instead, she maintains that the conjunction itself 
                                                          
8 The single-quotes here should strictly be understood as so-called  ?quasi-quotes ?, where this is a metalinguistic 
device that allows us to refer to the form of an expression without referring to the symbols.  The point is: the 
complex has such-and-such property just in case its components have thus-and-so property. 
9 Perhaps others will find this pluralism as obvious as I do.  As Lynch (2009: 88) points out, as far back as the early 
Wittgenstein we find correspondence theorists denying that the logical constants are themselves 
representational.  But there is remarkably little discussion of the resultant disunified metaphysics of truth. 
also corresponds.  Ontologically speaking, then, the monist is committed to everything my 
pluralist is committed to, and something else besides: not only is the conjunction T&1, but it is also 
TA itself; and it is this latter property that its truth consists in.10 
This puts the monist on the dialectical backfoot: given the extensional adequacy of the 
pluraliǯǯǡand that these properties satisfy the relevant 
constraints, we need to be given some other reason to think that truth always and everywhere 
consists in the same property.11  For all I want to insist on here, there may be such a reason.  What 
I am arguing is that no such constraint arises from logic or logical form. 
Of course, the above account only provides a theory for first-order negations, 
conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals; and since there are other logical operations and 
logical operations can be iterated infinitely, we will need further theories to cover sentences of 
arbitrary form and complexity.  Fortunately, we have a straightforward recipe for any truth-
functional complex.  Any complex will ultimately be composed of atomic sentences.  As such, for 
any sentence, the right-hand side of the relevant definitional biconditional will be of the same 
logical form as the sentence itself, but attributing TA to its atomic components.12 	ǡǡǮB?ȋȋƬȌB?  ȋƬȌȌǯ
(where the schematic letters stand for the atomic components).  Our theory of truth, T!, for such 
sentences is as follows: 
                                                          
10 ŶĂŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐ ƌĞĨĞƌĞĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŵŽŶŝƐƚŵŝŐŚƚ ƌĞƐŝƐƚ ƚŚŝƐďǇĚĞŶǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ůŝŬĞ  ?d&1 ?
ascribe properties, perhaps because T&1-ness is insufficiently sparse or natural.  But what is important is the 
extensional adequacy of the predicate.  If one denies that such predicates ascribe properties, one is committed 
to, e.g., nominalistic paraphrases of such talk  ? perhaps using the very definitional biconditionals the pluralist 
provides.  The pluralist can then say that the truth of the sentence consists in its satisfying the relevant 
paraphrase; and while the monist will admit that the relevant sentences satisfy these paraphrases, she will have 
to postulate that the sentences are also TA. 
11 Note that, even if the complex is TA, we reach a stand-off, as far as logic and logical form are concerned: for 
even if the complex has the relevant monistic property, it also has the relevant pluralistic property.  We need to 
be given a reason to think that its truth consists in one rather than the other. 
12 On this account, then, the truth of complexes of the same order of complexity composed of different kinds of 
complex will, strictly speaking, consist in different properties.  The atomic pluralist can likewise allow that the 
truth of different complexes composed of atomics with different content can consist in different properties.  
dŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚǇƚŚĞĚŝƐũƵŶĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ ?dA ?ŝƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞĨŽƌƐƵch a pluralist.  I have framed the proposal 
in terms of TA to emphasize that the pluralistic metaphysics of truth for complexes articulated here is officially 
neutral with regards to the nature of truth at the atomic level. 
 B?pB?qB?rB?sB?t (T!ȋǮB?ȋȋƬȌB? (s & ~ȌȌǯȌB?ȋTAȋǮǯȌಱȋȋAȋǮǯȌƬAȋǮǯȌȌש ~(TAȋǮǯȌƬ
TAȋǮǯȌȌȌ)). 
 
As we can see, the right-hand side of this definitional biconditional (highlighted) is of the 
same form as the complexes for which we are giving a theory of truth.  Again, any inflationist will 
be committed to the extensional adequacy of this property within the relevant sentences, so Ǯǯǡǡ
speaking, to anything more than the monist is.13  The disagreement is about whether or not the 
sentences also have a further property, as the monist contends; and, if they do, about which 
property their truth consists in. 
Let this be a standing challenge to the monist, then: to articulate some shortcoming the 
pluralistic theory articulated has with regards to logic or logical form in virtue of being pluralistic.  
My suspicion is that this challenge cannot be met.  Until some such shortcoming is articulated, we 
are entitled to conclude (i) that logic and logical form only impose structural constraints Ȃ 
constraints on the relations between the truth of different sentences Ȃ on a comprehensive 
metaphysics of truth, which are not automatically satisfied by a metaphysics just because it is 
monistic; and (ii) that there is a pluralistic metaphysics of truth that satisfies these constraints.  
Logic and logical form therefore give us no reason to prefer monism about truth to pluralism 
about truth.  There may, of course, be some other reason to think this pluralistic metaphysics is 
dissatisfactory, but that is simply another argument for another day.14 
                                                          
13 I, with Cotnoir (2009), read Edwards 2008 as proposing a theory somewhat like this; but Edwards (2009) 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨĚŝƐĂǀŽǁƐƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?KŶĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŽĨĂůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĐŽŵƉůĞǆƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ
consists in whatever property is relevant for truths about logic.  This is on the one hand surprising and 
counterintuitive, since a logically complex sentence need not be about logic itself.  But, more importantly, until 
ǁĞĂƌĞƚŽůĚǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŝƐ ?ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞŐŝŶƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƐŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐƐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝes 
ƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ?dŚŝƐŵĂŬĞƐŝƚƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞƚŚĂƚ^ƚƌŽůůŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƵƐĞĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƚŽ
provide a pluralist-friendly account of validity, also without offering any details about what this property is 
meant to be.  Until we are given some details, these proposals are no proposals at all; we might as well say that 
the truth of a complex consists in something-or-other, which satisfies the constraints. 
14 / ?ǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌĨŽƌĂĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐŶŽǁ ?so apologies that I cannot 
recall all those who have helped me along the way.  Special thanks are due to Robbie Williams and Michael 
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